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Summary:  This paper deals with the influence of hardship (frustration) clause (clausula 
rebus sic stantibus) on the contract and the possibility of the party affected by 
changed circumstances to request a judge to modify or terminate the contract. The 
paper presents a brief historical overview of the institute of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus in Croatian and some European legal systems. The conditions under 
which the affected party can make a claim to the court are listed and analyzed 
in the context of possible solutions de lege ferenda. Special attention is given to 
the scope of this clause, with the emphasis on unilateral contracts. Since case 
law always had a big impact on this institute, the paper brings numerous court 
decisions pertaining to modification or termination of contracts due to changed 
circumstances.
Keywords:   hardship (frustration) clause (clausula rebus sic stantibus), changed circumstances, 
contract modification and termination, unilateral contract, aleatory contract
1.  INTRODUCTION
Law of obligations is based on the principle that legal subjects are free to manage most of 
their obligations according to their wishes.1 This principle may be most pronounced in the part 
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pertaining to contractual relations, where it is manifested as a freedom to contract.2 However, 
if the parties agree to enter into a contract, they are obliged to fulfill their contractual obliga-
tions, as is imposed by one of the basic principles of the contractual law, the principle of pa-
cta sunt servanda. This principle stipulates that contracts, once entered into, must be fulfilled 
regardless of the circumstances that might happen later.3 This principle strengthens trust in 
contracts and compels contracting parties to comply with it.
There are two sides from which the principle of pacta sunt servanda can be observed. It may 
be considered that the contract is, indeed, sacred and that it becomes the law between the par-
ties, from which they cannot waiver from. However, it might be considered that it should be 
possible to depart from a given word in some exceptional situations.4 It seems it is much more 
reasonable to take the latter view, since the insistence on the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
might sometimes lead to situations that could undermine some other fundamental principles 
of civil law: the principle of equivalence of obligations, conscientiousness and fairness and 
equality of parties; which could cause contracting parties more harm than good. One can go 
even further and say that, by insisting obstinately on application of the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, the subjects who wish to enter into civil law relations might not be motivated to do 
so, since they would not have the possibility of terminating or modifying their relationships, 
which, through no fault of theirs, lost all significance for them.
Sometimes, especially in the case of long term contracts, circumstances that existed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract and were crucial for its conclusion, might subsequently 
change or disappear. Because of that, the fulfillment of contractual obligation can become 
excessivly burdensome or linked to numerous losses for the affected side. As early as the 12th 
century it was recognized that in such cases a certain deviation from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda should be allowed. Therefore, in many legal systems, a contractual party affected with 
changed circumstances has at his/her disposal a clause that allows, under certain conditions, 
modification or termination of contracts due to changed circumstances – clausula rebus sic 
stantibus (frustration or hardship clause).5
2.   A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CLAUSULA REBUS SIC 
STANTIBUS IN CROATIAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW
Clausula rebus sic stantibus did not exist in Roman law, so at that time, the debtor could 
not be relieved of his obligations if the circumstances that were crucial for the conclusion of 
1  Art. 2, Civil Obligations Act (COA), National Gazette 35/2005, 41/2008, 125/2011, 78/2015.
2  Klarić, P.; Vedriš, M, Građansko pravo, Zagreb, Narodne novine, 2014, p. 8.
3  Cf. ibid., p. 381. Also see Art. 9 of the COA: “A participant is obliged to fulfill his obligation and is responsible for its fulfillment.”
4  Eraković, A., Raskid ugovora zbog neispunjenja i raskid ili izmjena ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti, Aktualnosti hrvatskog 
zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, Godišnjak 17, Organizator, 2010, p. 125–126.
5  This ingrediant of legal affairs is today in Croatian, and in many other legal systems, a general institute that applies to all 
contracts, but earlier, until the second half of the 20th century, it could only have an effect if the contracting parties introduced 
it into their contract in a form of a clause (hence, it was an extraordinary ingredient of legal affairs). That is precisely why it is still 
called the ‘clause’ (clausula). Nikšić, S., Clausula rebus sic stantibus i ekonomska kriza, Zbornik Susreta pravnika Opatija 2016., p. 
162.
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the contract, changed afterwards.6 The theory of the influence of changed circumstances on 
the contract occurred in the 12th century because of an unstable medieval economy and the 
fact that medieval legal thought has developed under the influence of religious teaching and 
morale, which has led to increasing attention being given to situations when the violation of 
the equivalence of obligations occurred not only at the time of the conclusion of contract, but 
also later, due to changes in circumstances.7
However, very soon after changed circumstances began to influence parties’ positions, opi-
nions about clausula rebus sic stantibus’ incompatibility with the nature of contractual obliga-
tion and the principle of autonomy of parties, began to emerge. For example, in French law of 
17th and 18th century clausula rebus sic stantibus only applied to permanent feudal obligations.8 
Accordingly, the Code Civile prescribed that a contract becomes the law between contractual 
parties and it can be changed and terminated only by consent of both of those parties.9 The 
editors of Code Civile were inspired by the rationalistic and individualist philosophy of 18th 
century, which opposed the acceptance of the theory of changed circumstances. Namely, the 
supporters of this point of view agreed that the will of the legislator could be equated with the 
will of the contracting parties and, since the law cannot be changed without the legislator’s 
will, so the contracts should not be changed without the consent of both parties.10
6  At that time, only the greater force (vis maior) was the reason for which the debtor could be relieved of his obligations. More 
about other ways of ending obligations in Roman law see Romac, A., Rimsko pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 1994., p. 273–283.
7  Petrić, S., Izmjena ili raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti prema novom Zakonu o obveznim odnosima, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci,  Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007, p. 4.
8  Ibid.
9  Since the enactment of Code civile, up untill February 10, 2016 (actually untill October 1, 2016 when this change entered into 
force) this was regulated by Art. 1134: “Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne 
peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de 
bonne foi.” 
  Today, it is regulated in 
  Art. 1103: “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.” 
  Art. 1193.: “Les contrats ne peuvent être modifiés ou révoqués que du consentement mutuel des parties, ou pour les causes que 
la loi autorise.” 
  and 
  Art. 1104: “Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi. Cette disposition est d’ordre public.” 
  Code civile, Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve 
des obligations, NOR: JUSC1522466R, Version consolidée au 12 février 2016. (dalje u tekstu: Code civile). 
  Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=0D991658CCBCF9C9D2449C788661BA2t plg fr37s-3?ci
dTexte=JORFTEXT000032004939&dateTexte=20160212 (February 15, 2018).
10  French jurisprudence even then distinguished between civil and administrative law contracts. French administrative courts 
applied the theorie d’imprévision on contracts concluded by public administration bodies with private persons, for example, for 
supplying the administration bodies with the necessary items and materials; granting concessions for performing various public 
services (eg. urban transport) or performing public works. The reason for this was the shortage of materials and the rise in 
prices of goods and services during World War I, which greatly affected many contracts concluded by private persons with public 
administration bodies. Due to newly emerging circumstances, the position of the parties became more difficult because the 
concessionaires suffered major losses and sought to change or terminate the contract. Because of this, on March 30, 1916 French 
Conseil d’Etat allowed for modification of such a treaty that was concluded in 1904. Such an attitude was retained later and this 
resulted in the fact that such contracts in France could be changed if an affected party requested so, in case during its duration 
there were exceptional events that could not be anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the contract and consequently caused 
the affected party great losses and damages that largely exceeded reasonable expectations.
  On the other hand, with regard to the contracts of civil law, completely opposite attitude was taken. The Court of Cassation has 
taken the view that in case of civil law contracts vis maior could be the only reason for which the debtor should be released from 
his/her obligations and the contract terminated. If vis maior did not exist, so did not the conditions for debtor’s release from the 
contract, which is why he/she had to fulfill his/her obligation, regardless of the fact that its fulfillment has become more difficult 
due to changed circumstances. Čobeljić, Đ., Promenjene okolnosti u privrednom i građanskom pravu (Clausula rebus sic stantibus), 
Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1972, p. 15.
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Because courts took this position, the legislator often had to intervene in order to elimina-
te apparent injustices in certain types of contracts, so after World War II, a series of laws have 
been introduced that allowed courts to modify certain contracts due to changed circumstan-
ces. Over time, the number of such interventions has risen, which was widely criticized sugge-
sting that this creates a parallel legal system that only applies to certain contracts, which leads 
to legal uncertainty and greatly weakens the binding power of contracts.11 Until only recently, 
the French Code Civile did not allow changed circumstances to have any impact on contracts, 
but, as of February 10, 2016, in its Art. 1195, it is stipulated that, if an unforeseeable change 
in circumstances during the conclusion of the contract makes the execution excessively costly 
for a party who has not agreed to assume the risk, the latter may request a renegotiation of 
the contract from the other party. That party must continue to perform its obligations during 
the renegotiation. In case of refusal or failure of the renegotiation, the parties may agree to 
terminate the contract, on the date and under the conditions they determine, or ask the court 
to agree to adapt it. In the absence of agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, at 
the request of a party, revise the contract or terminate it on the date and on the conditions it 
determines.12
In other parts of Europe, the 19th century became the period of rejection of the institute 
of changed circumstances and numerous other civil law codification also refused clausula rebus 
sic stantibus as a natural ingredient of contracts.13 It is interesting that German law of the 18th 
century accepted this clause as a general rule in the two important codifications of that time,14 
but abandoned it in the 19th century under the influence of the ever-increasing criticisms that 
the institute allowed many abuses and was incompatible with the principle of party auto-
nomy.15 Thus, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch from 1900 did not accept clausula rebus sic stantibus as a 
general rule, but allowed it under certain circumstances.16 However, soon, in Germany many 
  One of the more prominent examples is when the Cassation Court in 1876, in the case concerning the amount of compensation 
for the use of the Canal de Craponne, decided there could be no increase in the fee, and by its decision obliged the channel owner 
to ensure that citizens could irrigate their land almost for free. See more about this case in Krulj, V., Promenjene okolnosti i 
ugovorna odgovornost (nemogućnost ispunjenja, viša sila, klauzula rebus sic stantibus), Beograd, 1967., p. 24–25.
11  Zindović, I., Revizija ugovora zbog promenjenih okolnosti – usporednopravna rešenja o klauzuli rebus sic stantibus, Strani pravni 
život, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2017, p. 38.
12  Art.1195, Code civile (Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 – art. 2): “Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible 
lors de la conclusion du contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse pour une partie qui n’avait pas accepté d’en assumer le 
risque, celle-ci peut demander une renégociation du contrat à son cocontractant. Elle continue à exécuter ses obligations durant 
la renégociation. 
  En cas de refus ou d’échec de la renégociation, les parties peuvent convenir de la résolution du contrat, à la date et aux conditions 
qu’elles déterminent, ou demander d’un commun accord au juge de procéder à son adaptation. A défaut d’accord dans un délai 
raisonnable, le juge peut, à la demande d’une partie, réviser le contrat ou y mettre fin, à la date et aux conditions qu›il fixe.”
13  Nikšić, S., Temeljna obilježja instituta izmjene ili raskida ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti, Liber amicorum Nikola Gavella, 
Građansko pravo u razvoju, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2007., p. 569.
14  Bavarian Civil Code of 1756 and Prussian Civil Code of 1794. More in Zindović, op.cit. 11, p. 39-40.
15  Petrić, op. cit. 7, p. 5-6.
16  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Reichsgesetzblatt 1896, S. 195, Nr. 21, ausgegeben am 24. 8. 1896, in Kraft seit 1. 1. 1900, (further in the 
text: BGB).
  For example, according to: a) § 321. BGB: “Wer aus einem gegenseitigen Vertrage vorzuleisten verpflichtet ist, kann, wenn nach 
dem Abschlusse des Vertrags in den Vermögensverhältnissen des anderen Theiles eine wesentliche Verschlechterung eintritt, 
durch die der Anspruch auf die Gegenleistung gefährdet wird, die ihm obliegende Leistung verweigern, bis die Gegenleistung 
bewirkt oder Sicherheit für sie geleistet wird.” (If a party who first has to fulfill his/her obligation feels that the opposite party 
will not fulfill his/her obligation, he/she may delay the fulfillment until he/she receives a certain security or the opposite party 
becomes able to fulfill. This applied to all such contracts.)
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contracts become unsustainable as a result of World War I.17 Due to the lack of legal regulation, 
the German courts resorted to various interpretations justifying the modification and termi-
nation of contracts due to changed circumstances. It remained unchanged until the beginning 
of the new millennium when, as a general rule, this institute was included in BGB in 2001.18
The only exception was the Italian Codice Civile of 1942, which, in its Art. 1467 and 1468, 
adopted, as a general rule, the right to terminate the contract due to changed circumstances.19 
However, although Italy is considered the cradle of recognition of the impact of clausula rebus 
sic stantibus, it should be emphasized that earlier Italian law was also hesitant to accept this 
clause as a general rule of contract law.20 However, Italian courts, in spite of those provisions, 
regularly took into account the impact of changed circumstances on the contract.21 As was the 
case in Germany and France, the consequences of the World War I, led to situations where 
problems of numerous debtors, who were no longer able to fulfill their obligations, needed 
to be resolved and in 1915 Italy allowed the use of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, which was 
at the beginning limited and temporary,22 but after adopting new Codice Civile in 1942, Italy 
 and 
  b) § 610: “Wer die Hingabe eines Darlehens verspricht, kann im Zweifel das Versprechen widerrufen, wenn in den 
Vermögensverhältnissen des anderen Theiles eine wesentliche Verschlechterung eintritt, durch die der Anspruch auf die 
Rückerstattung gefährdet wird.” (This provision applied only to the loan agreement and allowed withdrawal of the promised loan 
if the property of the future borrower is so aggravated that the return of the loan is at risk.)
 Available at: http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Fontes/BGBDR18961900.htm (March, 1, 2018).
17  The case law tried to resolve petitions where the contract was disturbed due to substantial changes in circumstances by extending 
the interpretation of the provision concerning the effect of vis maior on the contract. More in Zindović, op.cit. 11, p. 40.
  Nevertheless, problems arising from the changed circumstances could not be adequately resolved by applying this provision, 
since in the case of changed circumstances it was not always necessary for the debtor to be released from the obligations and 
the contract to be terminated, sometimes it would be sufficient to modify it according to the newly created situation, and based 
on the provisions relating to vis maior, that was not possible. Initially, the underlying theory of changed circumstances was the 
principle of “good faith” (Trau und Glauben), which is one of the fundamental principles of German contract law, but since 1922 
the courts’ intervention in the contract started to be justified by “the disspaearence of the basis of legal affair”: At the conclusion 
of the contract, the contracting parties took into account certain circumstances and counted on their duration. That contract 
would not have been concluded if they knew these circumstances would change or disappear. Accordingly, if “the basis for the 
legal affair” did not exist, or had dissapeared, the debtor should not be required to fulfill the contractual obligation. Čobeljić, 
op.cit. 10, p. 26-27.
  More about the theories by which the German case law tried to justify its intervention in the contract in case changed 
circumstances occurred, see Krulj, at 10, p. 36–45.
18  § 313. “(1) Haben sich Umstände, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden sind, nach Vertragsschluss schwerwiegend verändert 
und hätten die Parteien den Vertrag nicht oder mit anderem Inhalt geschlossen, wenn sie diese Veränderung vorausgesehen 
hätten, so kann Anpassung des Vertrags verlangt werden, soweit einem Teil unter Berücksichtigung aller Umstände des 
Einzelfalls, insbesondere der vertraglichen oder gesetzlichen Risikoverteilung, das Festhalten am unveränderten Vertrag nicht 
zugemutet werden kann.
  (2) Einer Veränderung der Umstände steht es gleich, wenn wesentliche Vorstellungen, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden 
sind, sich als falsch herausstellen.
  (3) Ist eine Anpassung des Vertrags nicht möglich oder einem Teil nicht zumutbar, so kann der benachteiligte Teil vom Vertrag 
zurücktreten. An die Stelle des Rücktrittsrechts tritt für Dauerschuldverhältnisse das Recht zur Kündigung.”
  Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, 26. 11. 2001 (BGBl. I S 3138), enacted since January 1, 2002.
  Full text available on: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf (Fabruary 20, 2018).
19  Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 7.
20  Zindović, loc.cit. 11, p. 38.
  Thus, the old Italian Codice Civile of 1804, which was constructed on the basis of the French Code Civile, accepted its solutions 
regarding the possibility of influence of the changed circumstances on civil law contracts. Therefore, the release of the debtor 
from his/her obligation was only possible in the event of vis maior. Ibid; Čobeljić, op.cit. 10, p. 21.
21  Krulj, op.cit. 10, p. 75.
22  Decrees dated May 27, 1915 and June 20, 1915. More in Zindović, loc.cit. 11, p. 38.
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became the first western state which accepted, as a general rule, the possibility of modification 
or termination of the contract due to changed circumstances in Art. 1467 – 1469.23
As far as Croatian legal system is concerned, in relation to e.g. Germany and France, this 
clause has begun to be accepted relatively early, not much later than in Italy. Namely, in 1955, 
the provisions of then applicable Inheritance Law defined clausula rebus sic stantibus as a natu-
ral part of the contract of support for life.24 At that time, other types of contracts could only 
be affected by changed circumstances in case parties specifically agreed upon it. This solution 
remained until 1978, when clausula rebus sic stantibus became a natural ingredient of all con-
tracts, after the entry into force of the “old” Law on Obligations.25
3.   CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN CROATIAN LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS DE LEGE LATA
In Croatian law of obligations, clausula rebus sic stantibus has been, since 1978, a general 
clause that applies to all contracts, without it having to be included in them, since it is va-
lid even when it is not specifically agreed upon. However, like all other contractual natural 
ingredients, if the parties do not want it to apply to their contract, they have to explicitly 
exclude it.26
23  Art. 1467 refers to bilateral contracts and gives the affected party the option of terminating the contract, provided that these 
circumstances do not enter into a regular contract risk, while the other party may prevent termination by offering a fair 
modification of the contract.
 “Contratto con prestazioni corrispettive.
  Nei contratti a esecuzione continuata o periodica ovvero a esecuzione differita, se la prestazione di una delle parti è divenuta 
eccessivamente onerosa per il verificarsi di avvenimenti straordinari e imprevedibili, la parte che deve tale prestazione può 
domandare la risoluzione del contratto, con gli effetti stabiliti dall’articolo 1458.
  La risoluzione non può essere domandata se la sopravvenuta onerosità rientra nell’alea normale del contratto.
  La parte contro la quale è domandata la risoluzione può evitarla offrendo di modificare equamente le condizioni del contratto.”
  Art. 1468 refers to unilateral contracts where the affected party has the right to reduce its obligation or modify the contract.
  “Contratto con obbligazioni di una sola parte.
  Nell’ipotesi prevista dall’articolo precedente se si tratta di un contratto nel quale una sola delle parti ha assunto obbligazioni, 
questa può chiedere una riduzione della sua prestazione ovvero una modificazione nelle modalità di esecuzione, sufficienti per 
ricondurla ad equità.”
  In Art. 1469, aleatory contracts are excluded from the applicatio of clausula rebus sic stantibus.
  “Contratto aleatorio.
  Le norme degli articoli precedenti non si applicano ai contratti aleatori per loro natura o per volontà delle parti.”
  Codice civile REGIO DECRETO 16 marzo 1942, n. 262, Approvazione del testo del Codice civile. (042U0262) Gazzetta Ufficiale 
n.79 del 4-4-1942), (further in the text: Codice civile), 
  Available at: http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/anteprima/codici/codiceCivile (February 8, 2018).
24  Art. 125 and 126 of Inheritance Law, Official gazette 20/55. Later Art. 120, Inheritance Law, Official gazette 52/71, 47/78, 
National gazette 56/00. Today Art. 584 of the COA.
25  Law on Obligations, Official gazette 29/1978, 39/1985, 46/1985, 57/1989, National gazette 53/1991, 73/1991, 3/1994, 7/1996, 
112/1999, 88/2001, (further in the text: “old” Law on Obligations).
26  Today this is prescribed by Art. 372, COA.
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In order for one party to have the right to request modification or termination of the con-
tract due to changed circumstances,27 the prerequisites set forth in Art. 369 of Civil Obligati-
ons Act (further: COA) must be met.28
These prerequisites are, as follows: a) exceptional circumstances,29 b) that appeared after 
the conclusion of the contract, c) which could not have been anticipated at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract; d) have caused the fulfillment of the obligation for one party to 
become excessively difficult or caused that party excessive losses.
Although, under (c) it is required that circumstances be objectively unpredictable, para-
graph 2 of the same article introduces a subjective component, as it determines that the affe-
cted party will not be able to demand modification or termination of the contract if it was 
bound to take these circumstances into account at the time of the conclusion of contract or 
could have avoided or overcame them. Thus, the affected party must not passively observe 
while changed circumstances cause the fulfillment of his/her obligation to become excessively 
difficult or cause him/her excessive loss.
27  It would appear that in this article the obligation of the contracting parties to resolve their problem by peaceful means could 
have been prescribed and only if this is not possible within a reasonable time, the affected party should have the right to refer 
the matter to the court. Also, it might make sense to explicitly prescribe that contractual parties (or affected party) first must 
try to modify the contract to the newly created situation, and only if it is not possible, request the termination of the contract. 
The reason for this is that, based on the present formulation art. Article 369 p. 1, one can only speculate wheather the legislator 
opted in favorem negotiatii (more infra, in the part related to the proposals de lege ferenda).
28  Since COA was enacted on January 1, 2006, many long-term contracts whose modification or termination is requested due to 
changed circumstances, have been concluded before that date and as such are subject to the provisions of Art. 133 of the “old” 
Law on Obligations that somewhat differently regulate this issue:
  Art 133. 
  “(1) If, after the conclusion of the contract, circumstances arise which make it difficult for one party to fulfill its obligations or 
if, because of them, the purpose of the contract cannot be fulfilled, and in both cases it is obvious that the contract no longer 
meets the expectations of the contracting parties and, by general opinion, it would be unfair to keep it in force as it is, a party to 
whom it is difficult to fulfill an obligation or a party that, because of changed circumstances, can not exercise the purpose of the 
contract, may require the contract to be terminated.
  (2) Termination of the contract may not be required if the party invoking the changed circumstances was obliged to take such 
circumstances into consideration or to avoid or overcome them at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
  (3) A party requesting the termination of a contract shall not be entitled to refer to the changed circumstances which occurred 
after the expiry of the time limit for the fulfillment of its obligation.
  (4) The contract will not be terminated if the other party offers or agrees for the terms and conditions of the contract to be 
modified fairly.
  (5) If the court terminates the contract, it shall, at the request of the other party, impose on the party requesting the 
termination an obligation to reimburse the other party the fair share of the damage he/she is suffering.” (translated by authors) 
That is precisely why there are so many court decisions that have been made relatively recently, but are based on the provisions 
of the “old” Law on Obligations.
29  What exact circumstances will be relevant to modification or termination of the contract, the COA does not refer to, because this 
is not important at all. It is possible to deal with different situations – natural events, political and social changes, administrative 
or other measures of public authority, economic incidents, etc. Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 28.
  In the field of commercial law, this institute was defined by Customary practices in trade of goods (Opće Uzance za promet 
robom), Official Gazette, 15/1954, 53/1991, in which this issue is regulated differently: in Customary practice… no. 56 these 
circumstances are explicitly divided into natural events (eg. droughts, floods, earthquakes); administrative measures (eg. ban or 
restriction of import or export, change of system of prices, tariff changes...) and economic incidents (eg. sudden or severe drop 
or growth of price.
  In the commentary of Customary practice… no. 56 it is also stated that all other events which, by their very nature and the 
intensity of their operation, cause the contract to be excessively difficult to enforce or because of which, there is an overly large 
loss for one of the contracting parties, can be taken into account. Kašanin, R.; Velimirović, T., Opšte uzanse za promet robom, sa 
objašnjenjima i sudskom praksom, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1974, p. 117–118.
  It should also be emphasized that, although this paper constantly referrs to “changed circumstances”, in Art. 369, COA it is not 
expressly stated that the circumstances, which existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract, must in fact have to change 
– the text of the provision speaks of “extraordinary circumstances” arising after the conclusion of the contract, which could not 
have been foreseen at that time.
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It is possible that the circumstances, after the conclusion of the contract, changed only 
once, but they may also change several times. In the latter case, the party has the right to 
request modification or termination of the contract several times, since the fact that the claim 
for termination of the contract for certain circumstances has been rejected, does not mean that 
the same person cannot, afterward, file a lawsuit due to subsequently changed circumstances.
“Pravomoćno odbijanje tužbenog zahtjeva da se zbog promijenjenih okolnosti raskine ugo-
vor, nije zapreka da se s istim zahtjevom pokrene nova parnica zbog naknadno promijenjenih 
okolnosti”(VS, Rev-1281/85, 23. listopada 1985).
“The court’s refusal to terminate the contract due to changed circumstances does not pre-
vent a new lawsuit from being initiated with the same application due to subsequently chan-
ged circumstances” (translated by authors).
Of the circumstances that usually cause one of the parties to seek modification or termina-
tion of the contract, it seems that the ones most frequently cited are related to changes in the 
value of money that disturb the equivalence of parties’ obligations. This equivalence can also 
be disturbed by changes in the interest rate policy; significant increases in the value of debtor’s 
obligations (without equivalence of obligations being disturbed at the same time); dispropor-
tionate difficulties in fulfillment of contract or increases of the costs of fulfilment of contract; 
complete loss of contractual significance because of changed circumstances etc.30
Although clausula rebus sic stantibus exists to alleviate problems for the party affected by 
changed circumstances, the opposite party of the contract has to also be taken into account, 
since he/she is in no way responsible for this new situation. The contract is not terminated 
because of some of his/her unacceptable behavior, as is the case in termination of contract for 
one party’s failure to fulfill his/her obligations. For this reason, modification or termination of 
the contract due to changed circumstances should never go to the detriment of the opposite 
side.31 That party can, therefore, pursuant to Art. 369, p. 4, refuse the termination of the con-
tract by offering or agreeing to a fair modification of it. He/she also has the right, in accordan-
ce with paragraph 5 of the same article, to demand compensation from the court for the fair 
share of the damage suffered because of the termination of the contract.32 Opposite party also 
has the right to be informed that the circumstances have changed and that the affected party 
will require modification or termination of the contract. The sanction for not informing oppo-
site party about affected party’s plans can be found in Art. 348 that pertains to all contracts.33 
However, COA specifically states in its Art. 370 that a party affected by changed circumstance 
30  Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 28-29.
31  Nikšić believes that this is probably one of the reasons why this institute is not enforced in practice very often. Nikšić, op.cit. 5, 
p. 178.
32  Modification or termination of a contract due to changed circumstances is requested by one contracting party to avoid the 
adverse consequences that would occur if, despite these new circumstances, it is insisted on the application of the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, the contract is modified or terminated in order to remove the harmful consequences from that 
contracting party. But if the termination of the contract happens, this often causes the damage to the opposite side and it should 
be stressed that neither party is responsible for the reason why the contract is being terminated. Slakoper, Z., Promijenjene 
okolnosti prema dosadašnjem i novom ZOO-u, Pravo u gospodarstvu, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2005, p. 35-56, 52.
33  Art. 348 of the COA: A contracting party which is obliged to notify the other party about the circumstances that are important to 
their mutual relationship, shall be liable for the damage suffered by the other party for failure to be notified in a timely manner.
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is liable for the damage suffered by the opposing side, if he/she has not informed the opposite 
party of its intent to modify or terminate the contract.34
Here, the authors wanted to briefly look at the so-called “Swiss franc” case and the po-
ssibility of its resolution by applying provisions concerning changed circumstances. Clausula 
rebus sic stantibus is also applied to loan agreements, but no case has been found in Croatia 
where loan users have taken advantage of the possibility of modifying or terminating loan 
contracts due to changed circumstances.35 The strengthening of the Swiss franc exchange rate 
was certainly unpredictable, not only to creditors, but also to banks, even the International 
Monetary Fund itself, and could be considered to be extraordinary circumstances that arioe 
after the conclusion of the contract and could not have been anticipated at that time.36 Due to 
these circumstances, the fulfillment of the obligation for the borrower has certainly become 
excessively difficult or caused excessive loss, so it can be concluded that all prerequisites of Art. 
369 of COA were fulfilled.
Regardless, loan users did not ask for modification or termination of the loan agreement 
due to changed circumstances.37 One of the reasons why this happened can be found in the 
consequences that clausula rebus sic stantibus has. In the first place, a number of disputed loan 
agreements were concluded before 2006, when the old Law on Obligations was in force, which 
did not allow the affected party to request the court to modify, but only the terminate the con-
tract.38 Since the consequence of any termination of the contract is a return to an earlier state 
(restitutio in integrum),39 both parties would have to return all that they have received from the 
opposite side, in the total amount, at once. Given that many loans were taken in fairly high 
amounts, it becomes a little clearer why loan users have not been inclined to take advantage 
of this opportunity. Also, account should be taken of the right of the opposing party to claim 
compensation for the fair part of the damage suffered as a result of the change or termination 
of the contract due to changed circumstances, which will certainly further discourage credit 
users from trying to solve their problem in this way.
34  Art 370 of the COA: A party that is authorized to modify or terminate a contract due to changed circumstance is obliged to 
inform the other party, as soon as it becomes aware that such circumstances have occurred, and if it does not, it shall be liable 
for the damage suffered by the other party for failure to do so in a timely manner.
  It appears that this provision could be improved by determining that the affected party, without such notice, can not seek 
modification or termination of the contract from court (more infra in the de lege ferenda proposals).
35  Matić, J., Izmjena ili raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti i ponešto o tzv. slučaju “švicarski franak”, Informator, 6424, 27-6-
2016, p. 2 and Trnavci, G., Valutna klauzula u švicarskim francima u BIH i region: nametanje dužničkog ropstva ili pošteno bankarstvo?, 
Zbornik radova Aktualnosti građanskog i trgovačkog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, 15/2017, Mostar, 2017, p. 250–252.
  The only case where the affected party demanded termination of the loan contract due to changed circumstances and succeeded, 
was found in Serbia in 2016. More from the media: https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/u-srbiji-pravomocno-raskinut-prvi-
ugovor-za-kredit-u-svicarcima-20161012/print (February 25, 2018).
36  Matić, ibid., p. 2-3.
37  Cf. ibid, p. 2–3.
38  Art. 133 of the “old” Law on Obligations.
39  Klarić; Vedriš, op.cit. 2, p. 484.
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4.  CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN CASE LAW
Given that this clause is an exception to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, it should be 
treated and interpreted as restrictively as possible, in order not to undermine the binding 
force of contracts. Therefore, the possibility of a court intermeddling into a contract conclud-
ed between two partners, in order to modify or terminate it, should only be allowed in lim-
ited situations. That is probably why the prerequisites that must be fulfilled in accordance 
with Art. 369 of the COA, are set so that they (as will be seen from the case law) cannot 
easily be fulfilled. Based on the analysis of the available court decisions, it becomes clear that 
Croatian courts in most cases have come to the conclusion that these prerequisites were not 
fulfilled in specific cases. Thus, for example, out of about forty analyzed court decisions of 
different courts in Croatia, made at different times, only two were found in which courts have 
deemed that the prerequisites necessary for modification or termination of the contract due 
to changed circumstances, were met.40
“Spornim se ukazuje pitanje u kolikoj se mjeri ratno stanje, kako u objektivnom smislu s 
obzirom na mjesto prebivališta stranaka i mjesto ispunjenja ugovorom preuzetih obveza, tako 
i na subjektivnom planu, odrazilo na tužitelje odnosno njihove roditelje i s tim u vezi na njih-
ovu (ne) mogućnost ispunjenja ugovorom preuzetih obaveza.
Međutim, kako se sudovi zbog svoje pogrešne ocjene da se ‘situacija nije izmijenila’, nisu 
bavili i ovim daljnjim pitanjima, to je činjenično stanje relevantno za valjanu primjenu materi-
jalnog prava ostalo nedovoljno utvrđeno. Stoga razloga ovaj sud je prihvatio reviziju tužitelja 
te pozivom na odredbu iz čl. 395. st. 2. ZPP-a ukinuo presudu suda i prvog i drugog stupnja i 
predmet vratio sudu prvog stupnja na ponovno odlučivanje” (Vs, Rev 1180/1993-2, 11. stu-
denog 2015).
“The question was raised as to how much the state of war, in objective sense in terms of the 
place of residence of the parties and the place of fulfillment of the contractual obligations, as 
well as in subjective sense, influenced prosecutors and their parents in relation to their (un)
possibility to fulfill contractual obligations.
However, as the courts, because of their erroneous assessment of “unchanged situation”, 
did not deal with these issues, the factual situation relevant to the valid application of sub-
stantive law remained insufficiently established. For this reason, this court accepted the re-
vision of the plaintiff and by referring to the provision in Art. 395 (2) of Civil Procedure Act, 
abolished the verdict of the courts of the first and second instances and returned the case to 
the court of the first instance” (translated by authors).
“Kako je u postupku utvrđeno da su se u razdoblju od sklapanja ugovora do dospjeća ob-
veze pogođene strane, promijenile okolnosti koje su postojale u trenutku sklapanja ugovora 
(došlo je do promjene odnosa vrijednosti dugovane činidbe i protučinidbe) i to na nepredvidiv, 
neizbježan i nesavladiv način u odnosu na tuženike-protutužitelje kao pogođenu stranu, te da 
su promijenjene okolnosti izazvale tešku povredu ekvivalencije, odnosno uslijed ovih novih iz-
40  There are probably much more court decisions dealing with this issue, but the authors have stoped at the number of about forty 
analyzed court decisions. Case law brought about by this paper is mainly downloaded from the web site http://www.iusinfo.hr/
Default.aspx (February, 20, 2018).
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vanrednih okolnosti ispunjenje obveze bi tuženicima-protutužiteljima nanijelo pretjerano ve-
liki gubitak, pravilna je ocjena suda prvog stupnja kako je protutužbeni zahtjev tuženika-pro-
tutužitelja usmjeren na raskid predmetnog ugovora osnovan, jer su ostvarene pretpostavke 
utvrđene odredbom članka 133. ZOO-a (sada čl. 369. ZOO-a)” Županijski sud u Splitu, Gž-
1855/2015, 10. ožujka 2016.).
“As has been established during procedure, from the time of the conclusion of the contract 
until affected party was due to fulfill contractual obligation, circumstances that existed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract have changed (there was a change in the ratio of the 
amount of obligations). The change was unpredictable, inevitable and impossible to overcome 
for affected party and caused this party an excessive loss or a serious breach of equivalence. 
Therefore, the court of first instance correctly assessed that the claim for termination of the 
contract was justifiable because prerequisites established by Article 133 of the Law on Obliga-
tions have been fulfilled (now Article 369 COA)” (translated by authors).
In the remaining decisions that were analyzed, a completely opposite position was as-
sumed (below the authors will only cite some of them). For example, one of the most common 
reasons for refusing modification or termination of a contract was the fact that the courts 
have come to the conclusion that the prerequisite found in Art. 369 § 2 were not fulfilled, be-
cause the contracting parties could have predicted, avoided or overcame the circumstances for 
which they later sought termination or modification of the contract.
“Naime, te okolnosti tužitelji su bili dužni uzeti u obzir u smislu čl. 133. st. 2. ZOO-a, kojim 
je propisano da raskid ugovora ne može se zahtijevati ako je strana koja se poziva na promije-
njene okolnosti bila dužna u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora uzeti u obzir te okolnosti ili ih je mogla 
izbjeći ili savladati” (Vs, Rev 1230/07-2, 28. listopada 2008.).
“Namely, those circumstances were plaintiff’s duty to be taken into account in the sense 
of Art. 133, p. 2 of the Law on Obligations (now Art. 369 of COA), which states that termi-
nation of a contract cannot be asked for, if the party who is invoking changed circumstances 
was obliged to take into account or to avoid or overcome said circumstances at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract” (translated by authors).
“(…) a o svim tim okolnostima koje su dakle kod tužitelja postojale i prije zaključenja spor-
nog ugovora tužitelj je trebao voditi računa i kod sklapanja samog ugovora. Stoga i po ocjeni 
ovoga suda tužitelj neosnovano pozivom na odredbu čl. 133. (…)” (Vs, Rev 2084/1991-2, 12. 
veljače 1991.).
“(…) when it comes to all of the circumstances that existed for the plaintiff even before 
the conclusion of the disputed contract, the plaintiff should have taken them into account 
while concluding the contract. Therefore, according to the judgment of this court, the plainti-
ff’s reference to the provision of Art. 133 (now Art. 369) is without basis (...)” (translated by 
authors).
“Naime, odredba čl. 133. st. 2. ZOO-a propisuje da se raskid ugovora (zbog promijenjenih 
okolnosti) ne može zahtijevati ako je strana koja se poziva na promijenjene okolnosti bila duž-
na u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora uzeti u obzir te okolnosti ili ih je mogla izbjeći ili svladati” (Vs, 
Rev-67/01-2, 14. veljače 2001.).
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“Namely, the provision of Art. 133 p. 2 of the Law on Obligations (now Art. 369 of COA) 
provides that the termination of a contract may not be required if the party invoking the chan-
ged circumstances was obliged to take such circumstances into account or avoid or overcome 
them at the time of the conclusion of the contract” (translated by authors).
“(…) tužena (…) trebala je u ugovoru kojeg je sama sačinila i ponudila na potpis tužitelju, u 
vrijeme sklapanja uzeti u obzir sve mogućnosti koje je morala i izbjeći ili svladati u ugovoru na 
određeni način” (Vs, Rev-211/1992-2, 8. travnja 1992.).
“(...) the defendant (...) in a contract that she herself has drafted and offered to the plaintiff 
to sign, should have taken into account all the possibilities that she had to avoid or overcome 
in a certain way, at the time the contract was concluded” (translated by authors).
Also, there is a considerable number of decisions in which courts have not allowed termi-
nation of the contract because changed circumstances occurred after a party that requested 
termination became late in fulfilling his/her obligation or the obligation was already fulfilled 
before the change occurred.
“(…) da se strana koja zahtijeva raskid ugovora ne može pozivati na promijenjene okolnosti 
koje su nastupile nakon isteka roka određenog za ispunjenje njene obveze.” (VS, Rev 1397/12-
2, 11. veljače 2005.)
“(...) a party requesting the termination of a contract cannot invoke the changed circum-
stances that occurred after the expiry of the deadline for fulfilling its obligations” (translated 
by authors).
“(…) da su promijenjene okolnosti na koje se poziva tužitelj nastupile sredinom 1998. 
godine, dakle, nakon isteka roka određenog za ispunjenje obveze tužitelja – to su pravilno 
nižestupanjski sudovi primijenili materijalno pravo kada su odbili tužbeni zahtjev” (VS, Rev 
710/03-2, 13. travnja 2005.).
“(...) that the changed circumstances invoked by the plaintiff occurred in mid-1998, that 
is, after the expiry of the deadline until which the plaintiff had to fulfill contractual obligation 
– therefore the lower court courts correctly applied substantive law when they rejected the 
claim” (translated by authors).
“(…) s obzirom na naprijed izneseno da tuženik-protutužitelj ne može tražiti raskid ugo-
vora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti, jer su stranke sadržaj ugovornih obveza već izvršile” (VS, 
Rev 965/07-2, 8. siječnja 2008.).
“(...) termination of the contract due to changed circumstances cannot be asked for be-
cause the parties have already fulfilled their contractual obligations” (translated by authors).
“(…) protutužitelj ne može pozivati na promijenjene okolnosti koje su nastupile nakon 
isteka roka određenog za ispunjenje njegove obaveze, jer je on već bio u zakašnjenju s isplatom 
polovice kupoprodajne cijene dana 28. siječnja 1991. godine, a promijenjene okolnosti da su 
nastupile nakon isteka tog roka” (VS, Rev 1505/02-2, 8. prosinca 2004.).
“(...) the counter-defendant cannot invoke the changed circumstances that occurred after 
the expiry of the deadline for the fulfillment of his obligation because he was already late with 
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the payment of half of the purchase price on January 28, 1991 and the changed circumstances 
occurred after the expiry of that deadline” (translated by authors).
According to one of the decisions, neither prerequisites set in Article 369 paragraph 2, nor 
those in paragraph 3 were fulfilled:
“Stoga, niti prema odredbi čl. 369. st. 2. ZOO-a tuženik ne bi mogao tražiti izmjenu ili 
raskid ugovora, budući da je isti ona ugovorna strana koja je bila dužna u vrijeme sklapanja 
ugovora uzeti u obzir te okolnosti. Pravilno sud drugoga stupnja ukazuje da neosnovanost za-
htjeva tuženika proizlazi i iz odredbe čl. 369. st. 3. ZOO-a, prema kojoj stranka koja zahtijeva 
izmjenu ili raskid ugovora ne može se pozivati na promijenjene okolnosti koje su nastupile 
nakon isteka roka određenog za ispunjenje njezine obveze. Kako je tuženik u vrijeme nastupa 
promijenjenih okolnosti već bio u zakašnjenju, za ishod je ovoga spora irelevantno je li tuže-
nik mogao te okolnosti predvidjeti u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora” (VS, Rev 710/13-2, 4. rujna 
2013.).
“Therefore, under the provisions of Art. 369 p. 2 of COA, the defendant could not seek 
modification or termination of the contract, since the defendant was the same contractual 
party that was obliged to, at time of the conclusion of the contract, take into account those 
circumstances. Second instance court properly indicated that the defendant’s claim inadmissi-
bility also arises from the provisions of Art. 369 p. 3 of COA, according to which the party 
requesting the modification or termination of the contract cannot rely on the changed cir-
cumstances which occurred after the expiry of the deadline for fulfilling his obligation. As the 
defendant, at a time of appearance of the changed circumstances, was already late in fulfilling 
his obligation, for the outcome of this dispute it is irrelevant whether the defendant could 
have predicted these circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the contract”(translated 
by authors).
Surprisingly, it was found that in a relatively large number of cases, the affected party 
believed that, because of the changed circumstances, the contract could be terminated by uni-
lateral declaration of will, which is not possible. Although this kind of termination of contract 
in legal theory is referred to as unilateral termination under the law,41 it does not happen by 
a unilateral declaration of will of the affected party, nor by the fulfillment of certain prerequ-
isites. Also, according to case law, termination of contract cannot be discussed at court as a 
result of complaint or preliminary issue. It can only be considered if affected party submitted 
a lawsuit or a counterclaim asking a court to modify or terminate the contract.42 This derives 
from the provision of Art. 371 which carries the title “Circumstances Significant for a Court 
Decision”,43 and as will be seen from the aforementioned decisions, the jurisprudence has also 
assumed such an attitude.
“The termination of the contract due to changed circumstances cannot be discussed as a 
preliminary matter, but only if a lawsuit or counter-claim for termination of the contract has 
been filed” (translated by authors).
41  Klarić; Vedriš, op.cit 2, p. 481-484.
42  Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 47.
43  Art. 371 of the COA: When deciding on modification of the contract or its termination, the court will be guided by the principle 
of conscientiousness and fairness, taking into account in particular the purpose of the contract, the division of risks arising out 
of the contract or from the law, the duration and effect of the extraordinary circumstances and the interests of both parties.
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“Međutim, raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti u smislu odredbe čl. 369 st. 
1 ZOO-a, može se zahtijevati samo konstitutivnom tužbom (...), zbog čega jednostrani 
raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti nema nikakav pravni učinak” (ŽS u Varaždinu, 
Gž.1597/08-2, 22. prosinca 2008.).
“However, the termination of the contract due to changed circumstances in terms of the 
provision of Art. 369 p. 1 of COA, may be required only by a claim addressed to court (...), 
which is why the unilateral termination of the contract due to changed circumstances has no 
legal effect” (translated by authors).
“(...) se raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti ne može dati prostom izjavom kao 
što to primjerice propisuje institut raskida ugovora zbog neispunjenja, već u slučaju postojan-
ja pretpostavki za raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti stranka može samo od suda 
tražiti da se ugovor raskine” (Vs Rev 734/2010-2, 6. veljače 2013.).
“(...) the termination of a contract due to changed circumstances cannot be made by a sim-
ple statement as is, for example, possible in case of termination of the contract due to failure 
to fulfill obligations. In the event of the existence of a prerequisites for termination of the 
contract due to changed circumstances, the party may only request the court to terminate the 
contract” (translated by authors).
“Prema tome, ugovorna strana koja se poziva na promijenjene okolnosti može zahtijevati 
da sud donese odluku o tome hoće li se ugovor raskinuti i ugovor se tada raskida (prestaje) 
odlukom suda – a ne izjavom te ugovorne strane o raskidu” (Vs Rev 19/2006-2, 21. ožujka 
2006.).
“Accordingly, a contracting party invoking the changed circumstances may require a court 
to decide whether the contract will be terminated and the contract shall then be terminated 
by a court decision and not by a declaration of that contracting party” (translated by authors).
“Isto upravo iz čl. 133. (danas čl. 369.) st 4. i 5. ZOO-a proizlazi da je tužitelj morao pokrenu-
ti postupak radi izmjene ili raskida ugovora, a to nije učinio, već je jednostrano raskinuo ugov-
or i o tome obavijestio tužitelja” (Visoki trgovački sud, Pž 3308/04-4, 8. svibnja 2007.).
“Art. 133. p. 4 and 5 of the Law on Obligations (now Art. 369) state that the plaintiff had 
to initiate proceedings for modification or termination of the contract, however, the plaintiff 
did not do so, but unilaterally terminated the contract and informed opposing party about 
it”(translated by authors).
“(...) strana koja se poziva na promijenjene okolnosti ne može sama raskinuti ugovor već 
takav zahtjev može podnijeti sudu koji donosi odluku o ne/osnovanosti tog zahtjeva” (Visoki 
trgovački sud Pž 4797/04-3, 11. rujna 2009.).
“(...) a party invoking the changed circumstances cannot terminate the contract by him-
self, but may submit such a request to court which will decide whether such claim is justified” 
(translated by authors).
“(...) raskid ugovora zbog promijenjenih okolnosti može se zahtijevati samo konstitutiv-
nom tužbom u povodu koje sud može konstitutivnom presudom odlučiti o raskidu tog prav-
nog odnosa, a tužitelj ovdje nije ustao tužbom na raskid ugovora, već je jednostranim aktom 
odustao od ugovora (raskinuo ugovor)” (Vs Rev 1190/2007-2, 13. siječnja 2011.).
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“(...) the termination of the contract due to  changed circumstances may only be demanded 
by lawsuit on the grounds of which the court may decide to terminate that legal relationship, 
and in this case, the plaintiff did not initiate lawsuit for termination of the contract, but ter-
minated the contract by a unilateral act” (translated by authors).
5.   THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF CLAUSULA REBUS SIC 
STANTIBUS – DE LEGE LATA AND DE LEGE FERENDA
The institute of changed circumstances, apart from civil law, can be applied in some other 
branches of law. For example, changed circumstances have an impact in administrative law 
concerning administrative acts44 and on international treaties.45
When referring to clausula rebus sic stantibus in the context of civil law, it seems that it 
could also affect property rights by influencing a contract from which property right arises, 
despite the fact that in this part of civil law, this institute is not known.46
44  The adoption of a new administrative act is possible in a situation where the circumstances on which the previous administrative 
act is based, have changed, as the new circumstances prevent its stay in force. In this case, the so-called “opposite administrative 
act” must be adopted. This applies to those administrative acts that create certain lasting situations that establish a lasting legal 
relationships. It should be emphasized that the change of circumstances will not affect the operation of the earlier administrative 
act because it will be valid until the new (opposite) act is made. More in Đelmo, Z., Primjena klauzule “rebus sic stantibus” u 
upravnom pravu, Uprava, Stručni časopis; Fakultet za javnu upravu, Sarajevo, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2011, p. 47-48.
45  It should be emphasized that the clausula rebus sic stantibus in science and practice is a controversial way of terminating the 
contract in international law. However, it was necessary to allow for the possibility of termination of international treaties 
because of this reason, as well, since there are situations where the persistence and enforcement of the international treaty 
would be “inappropriate, unreasonable, unjust and dangerous”. Ibler, V., Rječnik međunarodnog javnog prava, 2nd ed., Zagreb, 1987, 
p. 124.
  It has to be noted that in international law there are reservations about this clause as it can create a great legal uncertainty. 
Therefore, when governments invoke clausula rebus sic stantibus, the other party often either denies the possibility of its 
influence on the contract or at least claims that there is no justification for its application to the case in question. Andrassy, J., 
Međunarodno pravo, 9th ed., Zagreb, 1987, p. 348.
  However, Art. 62. The Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties provides for the possibility that, due to the 
changed circumstances, international agreements cease to exist:
  “Fundamental change of circumstances
  1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of 
a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the 
treaty unless:
  (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; 
and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
  2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
  (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either 
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
  3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.” 
  Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, National gazette, International Treaties, 16/93.
  Furthermore, in paragraph 9 of the Explanatory Notes to the Convention, prerequisites under which a contracting party may 
invoke a change of circumstances as the basis for termination of a contract or withdrawal from the contract, are set. Namely they 
are as follows: circumstances which existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract must change; this change of circumstances 
must be important; must be such that the parties could not foresee it; the existence of certain circumstances must be an important 
basis for the consent of the parties to be bound by the contract and the effect of the change must radically alter the extent of the 
obligations still to be fulfilled under the contract. More in Kinder, I., Primjenjivost klauzule Rebus Sic Stantibus na međunarodni 
ugovor o vojnoj bazi SAD-a u Guantanamu, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2012, p. 1124-1125.
46  According to Stipković, Z., in Gavella, N. et al., Stvarno pravo, 2. svezak, Narode novine, Zagreb, 2007, p. 10, based on Art.242 
of  Law on Property and Other Property Rights, National Gazette 91/1996, 68/1998, 137/1999, 22/2000, 73/2000, 129/2000, 
114/2001, 79/2006, 141/2006, 146/2008, 38/2009, 153/2009, 143/2012, 152/2014 that deals with termination of easement.
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Except in Art. 369 to 372 of COA, changed circumstances and their impact on binding 
relationships are explicitly mentioned in several other places of this Act.47 This is, for example 
the case with Art. 268 p. 2;48 Art. 584 p. 1;49 Art. 640 p. 2;50 
 Case law:
  “Predmet ovoga spora je zahtjev tužitelja za raskid ugovora, što ga je on sklopio s tuženikom 20. siječnja 1987. godine, a kojim 
je osnovana stvarna služnost prolaza i provoza za korist tamo navedenih nekretnina tuženika na teret nekretnina tužitelja iz 
razloga promijenjenih okolnosti nakon sklapanja tog ugovora, a to sve temeljem odredbe čl. 133. Zakona o obveznim odnosima 
– dalje: ZOO. Sud prvog stupnja je utvrdio da su stranke sklopile sporni ugovor kojim je osnovana služnost u korist tuženikovih 
nekretnina i to k.č.br. 978 i 980/1 preko tužiteljeve parcele k.č.br. 979 sve k.o. Biograd, te u korist spomenute tužiteljeve parcele 
k.č.br. 979 preko tuženikove parcele k.č.br. 980/1.
  Taj sud je također utvrdio da je nakon sklapanja tog ugovora tuženik svoju k.č.br. 980/1 darovao sinu B.T., preko koje je nakon 
toga formiran put pod oznakom k.č.br. 980/6, a koji put je kupio tužitelj, te da je tuženik tužitelju prodao šupu, do koje je također 
dolazio preko njegove parcele. Nižestupanjski sudovi smatraju da su time nastupile nove okolnosti nakon sklapanja spornog 
ugovora, koje otežavaju ispunjenje tužiteljeve obveze, odnosno da se zbog njih više ne može ostvariti svrha ugovora, jer više 
nema potrebe za putnom komunikacijom preko navedenih čestica kako tužitelju, tako i tuženiku, pa da bi bilo nepravično održati 
na snazi ugovor stranaka, a to na temelju čl. 133. ZOO” (VSRH Rev 3035/2000-2, 24. lipnja 2003.).
  “The subject of this dispute is plaintiff’s request to terminate the contract, which he concluded with the defendant on January 
20, 1987, and which established the easement of passage and transit for the benefit of the aforementioned property of the 
defendant and as the burden of the plaintiff’s property, due to changed circumstances after the contract was made, all under the 
provisions of Art. 133 of the Law on Obligations (today Art. 369, COA).
  The court of first instance found that the parties had concluded a disputed contract for establishing the easement in favor of the 
defendant’s property, c.p. no. 978 and 980/1 through plaintiffs’ property, c.p. no. 979, all in cadastral municipality of Biograd, 
and for the benefit of the mentioned plaintiffs’ property c.p. no. 979 through the defendants property c.p. no. 980/1.
  The court also found that after the conclusion of that contract the defendant had his c.p. no. 980/1 donated to B.T’s son, through 
which a path was formed under the marked c.p. no. 980/6, which the plaintiff had bought, and that the defendant sold the 
prosecutor a shed, to which he also came through his land.
  Courts considered that new circumstances have arisen following the conclusion of the contract, which make it difficult for the 
plaintiff to fulfill conctractual obligations and that the purpose of the contract can no longer be fulfilled because there is no longer 
a need for road communication over the above mentioned property, both to the plaintiff and the defendant, so it would be unfair 
to maintain the contract according to Art. 133. of the Law on Obligations (now Art. 369 of the COA)” (translated by authors).
  However, it should be emphasized that in this particular case the Supreme Court did not find that the new circumstances led to 
the difficulties in fulfillment of the plaintiff’s obligation, as it determined in the same decision:
  “Međutim, ovaj sud ne nalazi da navedene okolnosti otežavaju ispunjenje tužiteljeve obveze u odnosu na stanje u vrijeme 
sklapanja ugovora s jedne strane (…). U ovom slučaju se zaključuje da tužitelj, koji se poziva na promijenjene okolnosti, tj. 
promjenu vlasnika nekretnina ne samo da je u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora bio dužan uzeti ih u obzir, već i da ih je uzeo, pa je 
unatoč tome tražio raskid tog ugovora.” 
  “However, this court does not find that the mentioned circumstances make it difficult for the plaintiff to meet his obligations in 
relation to the situation at the time of the conclusion of the contract. (...) In this case, it is concluded that the plaintiff, referring 
to the changed circumstances, ie. the change of the owner of the property, was not only obliged to take them into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, but did take them into account, and despite of that, sought the termination of contracts” 
(translated by authors).
  On the other hand, had the Supreme Court found that the presumptions set out in Art. 133, p. 2 (now Article 369, p. 2) have 
been fulfilled, the changed circumstances would affect the existence of the easement itself by influencing the contract that was 
the basis of the easement.
47  There are also provisions that do not mention the formulation of “changed circumstances”, but it can be deduced from the text 
that it was what was had in mind. Eg. Art. 626 of the COA refers to the possibility of price changes in a construction contract 
which is possible if the price of the elements on the basis of which the price of construction is formed, is increased. This, too, is 
the case of changed circumstances that have an impact on the increase or decrease of the price of the construction, but as such 
are not explicitly mentioned.
48  Art. 268, p. 2: The pre-contract does not bind if the circumstances of its conclusion have so changed that it would not have been 
concluded if such circumstances existed at that time.
  This article does not mention which circumstances can affect pre-contract, but a pre-contract is be treated like any other type of 
contract and as such should be subject to the provisions of the COA relating to other bilateral contracts. The only special feature 
of this type of contract is that the contracting parties take over the obligation to later conclude the so-called “main contract”. 
Therefore, as in all other contracts, the provision of Art. 369 (and others detailing changed circumstances) should apply, in 
relation to modification and termination. More in Pavlović, M., Predugovor i kada se može smatrati glavnim ugovorom, Pravo u 
gospodarstvu, Vol. 12, No. 6., 2011, p. 1229.
49  Art. 584, p. 1: General provisions of this Law concerning changed circumstances apply to contract on support for life.
50  Art. 640, p. 2: A partner is not obligated to subsequently increase the contracted stake, but if the common goal could not be 
achieved due to the changed circumstances, the partner that does not want to increase his/her stake may leave the partnership 
or be excluded from it.
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Art. 727 p. 2;51 Art. 829,52 Art. 902, p. 5;53 Art. 903, p. 6;54 Art. 34355 and 1096.56 For this part 
of the paper some of the most important are Art. 343 and 1096, which relate to liability for 
damages and Art. 534 which relates to a contract on support for life. 
5.1.  CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
Except contracts, changed circumstances also affect some non-contractual relationships, 
such as liability for damages, which is explicitly stated in two places in the COA. Art. 343 de-
termines that the debtor will be free from liability for damages if he proves that he could not 
fulfill his obligation or that he was late in fulfilling his obligations due to external, extraordi-
nary and unforeseeable circumstances, arising after the conclusion of contract, that he could 
not prevent, remedy or avoid.
“Dužnik se ne može osloboditi odgovornosti za zakašnjenje u ispunjenju obveze iz ugovora 
pozivom na okolnosti (odljev radne snage i angažiranje mehanizacije i voznog praka za potre-
be obrane) koje je trebao imati na umu pri zaključenju ugovora i utvrđivanju rokova izgradnje, 
budući da su u to vrijeme ratne operacije već bile u toku” (Žs u Zagrebu, Gž-552/04, 15. veljače 
2005.).
“The debtor cannot be released from liability for delay in the fulfillment of the contractual 
obligation by reference to the circumstances (the outflow of the workforce and the engage-
ment of the mechanization and vehicles for the purposes of defense) which he should have 
taken into account when concluding the contract and fixing the time limits for construction, 
since at that time, war operations were already in progress” (translated by authors).
Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 1096, changed circumstances also allow the modification 
of the compensation in the form of annuity, in the event that the court has determined that 
the damage is to be repaired in the form of annuity. Specifically, the aforementioned clause 
provides for the possibility of reducing, abolishing or increasing the remuneration, provided 
51  Art. 727, p. 2: If parties agreed upon a place and a way in which to keep objects of bailment, bailee may change agreed upon 
conditions only if changed circumstances require so, otherwise, a bailee is responisble for accidental ruin or accidental damage 
to the item.
52  Art. 829: For important reasons, that have to be mentioned, and in particular because of the failure of the other party to comply 
with the contractual obligation or due to changed circumstances, each party may terminate the contract that was drafted for an 
indefinite period of time, without notice, or terminate the contract that was drafted for a certain period of time, before that time 
expires.
53  Art. 902 p. 5: If the organizer has terminated the contract due to the extraordinary circumstances that occurred while he/she was 
fullfilling his/her contractual obligations, he/she is obliged to return to passengers a difference in price between the contracted 
and provided services and take all measures necessary to protect the interests of the passengers.
54  Art. 903 p. 6: A passenger is not entitled to compensation for damages referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article if the 
modifications of essential parts of the contract were due to exceptional external circumstances, which the organizer could not 
foresee, avoid or eliminate.
55  Art. 343: The debtor shall be released from liability for damages if he/she proves that he/she could not fulfill contractual 
obligation or was late in fulfilling that obligation due to external, extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances that happened 
after the conclusion of a contract, which he/she could not prevent, remedy or avoid.
56  Art. 1096: The court may, at the request of the injured party, increase the amount of compesation in the form of the annuity and 
may, at the request of the person responsible for damages, lower or abolish it, if the circumstances which the court had had in 
mind when making the previous decision, significantly changed.
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that the circumstances which the court took into account when determining the payment of 
compensation in this form, have changed significantly, if the injured party or the party that is 
paying the annuity so requests.57
“Samo ako se znatnije promijene okolnosti koje je sud imao na umu pri donošenju pri-
jašnje odluke o visini rente na ime izgubljenog uzdržavanja, sud može na zahtjev oštećenika 
za ubuduće povećati rentu ili je na zahtjev štetnika smanjiti ili ukinuti (Žs u Bjelovaru, Gž-
1297/99, 10. lipnja 1999.).
“Only if the circumstances that the court had in mind when deciding on the amount of 
annuity due to lost support, significantly changed, the court may, at the request of the injured 
party, increase the annuity in the future or, at the request of the person responsible for dam-
ages, reduce or abolish it” (translated by authors).
“Kad je oštećeniku dosuđena novčana naknada za nematerijalnu štetu u obliku rente, sud 
može u slučaju znatnijih promjena okolnosti ubuduće povećati rentu” (Vs, Rev-506/91, 4. 
travnja 1991.).
“When the injured party receives a financial compensation for non-pecuniary damage in 
the form of annuity, the court may, in the event of significant changes in circumstances, in-
crease the annuity in the future (translated by authors).
“Znatnije izmijenjene okolnosti utječu na mogućnost izmjene visine rente na ime naknade 
nematerijalne štete jednako kao i na mogućnost izmjene visine rente dosuđene na ime nak-
nade materijalne štete” (Vs, Gzz-28/88, 31. ožujka 1989.).
“Substantially changed circumstances affect the possibility of changing the amount of 
annuity for the benefit of non-pecuniary damage, as well as the possibility of altering the 
amount of annuity granted for pecuniary damage” (translated by authors).
“Revident, međutim, s pravom ističe da sudovi nisu ispitali odlučne okolnosti iz kojih se 
može izvesti zaključak da je došlo do znatnije promjene okolnosti koje je sud imao u vidu pri 
donošenju prijašnje odluke o renti. 
Prema, naime, odredbi čl. 196. Zakona o obveznim odnosima (Narodne novine, broj 
53/1991, 73/1991 i 3/1994) sud može na zahtjev oštećenika za ubuduće povećati rentu ako su 
znatnije promijenjene okolnosti koje je sud imao na umu pri donošenju prijašnje odluke. Je li 
do toga u konkretnom slučaju došlo kao npr. znatnijeg povećanja štete zbog povećanih izda-
taka za tuđu pomoć i njegu, sudovi nisu ispitali» (Vs, Rev 3213/1995-2, 12. listopada 1999.).
“The person seeking revision, however, rightly points out that the courts have not exam-
ined the decisive circumstances from which it can be inferred that there was a significant 
change in the circumstances the court took into account when making the previous decision 
on annuity.
57  Art. 1096 COA
  Application of clausula rebus sic stantibus will not be possible if the annuity was capitalized, which means that the injured party 
has received a full amount to which he/she was entitled, which is allowed under Art. 1088 p. 4 and 5 of the COA in the event that 
the debtor has not provided the insurance that the court ordered, or if there were any other serious reasons for capitalization of 
the annuity. Crnić, I., Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Napomene, komentari, sudska praksa i prilozi, Organizator, Zagreb, 2006, p. 850.
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According to the provisions of Art. 196 of the Law of Obligations (Official Gazette 53/1991, 
73/1991 and 3/1994) (now Art. 1096 of COA), the court may, at the request of the injured 
party, increase the annuity in the future, if there is a significant change in the circumstances 
the court had in mind when making the previous decision. Has this been the case: did, for 
example, a substantial increase in damages due to increased expenses for someone else’s help 
and care occurred, the courts have not examined” (translated by authors).
5.2.  CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALEATORY CONTRACTS
As far as aleatory contracts are concerned, it is interesting that the Italian Codice Civile, in 
Art. 1469 explicitly states that changed circumstances do not influence aleatory contracts, and 
some authors who have dealt with this issue also state that the same applies to Croatian law of 
obligations.58 However, it should be borne in mind that changed circumstances have a major 
impact on the contract of support for life, which is an aleatory contract, in its own nature.59
Art. 584. of the COA states that the contract of support for life shall be governed by the 
general provisions concerning changed circumstances. Therefore, the courts may change the 
recipient’s right to support into a lifetime annuity, if it is appropriate for both contracting 
parties.60
Several examples of court decisions have been found, which confirm this:
“Postoji, međutim, mogućnost da se, za slučaj promijenjenih okolnosti nakon zaključenja 
ugovora, u smislu odredbe iz čl. 120. ZN-a, (sada čl. 584. st. 1. ZOO-a) nanovo urede odnosi 
između stranaka, a tek ako je to nemoguće, može se raskinuti i ugovor...” (Vs, Rev-x 1006/10-
2, 19. siječnja 2011.).
“There is, however, a possibility, in the case of changed circumstances that have occurred 
after the conclusion of the contract, in the sense of the provision of Art. 120 of Inheritance 
Act (now Art. 584, p. 1 of COA) to modify contractual relations between the parties, and only 
if this is not possible, can the contract be terminated (...)” (translated by authors).
“Tužiteljica ni u tužbi, a niti tijekom trajanja postupka pred nižestupanjskim sudovima nije 
upirala na promijenjene okolnosti kao razlogom raskida ugovora, pa isticanje ovog prigovora 
tek sada u revizijskom stadiju postupka predstavlja prigovor nepotpuno utvrđenog činjenič-
nog stanja, a iz kojih razloga izjavljivanje revizije nije dopušteno (čl. 385. st. 3. ZPP-a).” (Vs, 
Rev-1660/1998-2, 9. svibnja 2001.).
58  Art. 1469: “Le norme degli articoli precedenti non si applicano ai contratti aleatori per loro natura o per volontà delle parti.”
59  Čobeljić, op.cit. 10, p. 81; Petrić. op.cit. 7, p. 26-27.
  The fact that the contract on support for life is aleatory is extremely important for its validity, because, if it was not aleatory (ie. 
support provider knew that the recipient will die in a short period of time), contract on support for life would not be valid. In best 
case, it might be treated as some other type of contract to which provisions relating to the support for life will not be applied. 
More in Gavella, N., Nasljedno pravo, Informator, Zagreb, 1990, p. 369.
60  Everything said for contract on support for life applies to the contract on support untill death, in accordance to Art. 589 of the 
COA.
46
PRAVNI VJESNIK GOD. 34 BR. 2, 2018.
“The plaintiff, neither in her lawsuit nor during the course of the proceedings before lower 
courts, did uphold the changed circumstances as the reason for termination of the contract, so 
making this objection only now, at the audit stage of the proceedings, represents an objection 
of an incompletely established factual situation, for which reason the revision is not allowed 
(Art. 385 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act” (translated by authors).
“(...) nisu nastupile promijenjene okolnosti u smislu čl. 120. st. 1. ZN-a (danas čl. 584. 
st. 1. ZOO-a, op. a.) odnosno nisu ispunjene zakonom propisane pretpostavke za izmjenu 
sklopljenog ugovora odnosno njegov raskid zbog promijenjenih okolnosti” (Žs u Bjelovaru, Gž 
564/2014-2, 27. kolovoza 2015.).
“(...) no changed circumstances have occurred in the sense of Art. 120 p. 1 of the Inheri-
tance Act (now Art. 584 p. 1 of the COA), so the prerequisites for modification or termination 
of the contract due to changed circumstances have not been fulfilled” (translated by authors).
At this point, it should be emphasized that the possibility of terminating contracts because 
of the changed circumstances was, for the first time in Croatian legal system, actually intro-
duced in the context of a contract on support for life. This happened much earlier than clausula 
rebu sic stantibus became a natural ingredient of all other types of contracts. The possibility to 
terminate a contract of support for life has been a natural ingredient of this type of contract 
since 1955, while for other contracts, it became a natural ingredient twenty years later, after 
‘old’ Law of Obligations entered into force in 1978.61
At first glance, it is clear why it was necessary to allow the possibility of modification or 
termination because of the changed circumstances in relation to contract of support for life, 
despite of the fact (or maybe just because of the fact) that they are aleatory. These contracts 
are aleatory precisely because they were conceived in such a way that contracting parties ne-
ver really know how long they will last and parties, also, never know the exact content of the 
support provider’s obligation, since these elements depend primarily on the length of life of 
the recipient of support and his health. In view of this, there are many circumstances that can 
change after contract of support for life is concluded, which might have a significant impact on 
the ability to fulfill an obligation. Some of these circumstances include, for example, a change 
in the health or property status of a provider of support or his/her family members, or chan-
ges in the property that the recipient of support transfers to the provider as a payment for 
providing support – for example, destruction or significant damage to the property.62 Because 
of that, it is clear why the option of amending or terminating the contract of support for life 
due to changed circumstances was introduced in inheritance law even then.
Some authors go as far as to state that, although clausula rebus sic stantibus is a natural 
ingredient of all other contracts, it should be an essential ingredient of contracts of support 
for life and contracts of support until death. As a result, contracting parties should not be 
allowed, in advance, to waive the right to ask for modification or termination of these contra-
cts due to changed circumstances.63 The reason for this being certain peculiarities that exist 
61  See note 24 and 25. More in Nikšić, op.cit. 5, p. 160.
62  More detalis in Belaj, V., Raskid ili izmjena ugovora o doživotnom uzdržavanju zbog promijenjenih okolnosti, Pravni vjesnik, Vol. 28, 
No. 3-4, 2001, p. 15-17.
63  More in Crnić, op.cit. 57, p. 494.
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on the side of these contracts, which do not exist in any other type of contracts – parties very 
often live together or at least have close everyday contacts with each other, their relationship 
can become delicate, there is uncertainty regarding the duration of these contracts and the 
content of the obligation of the provider of support.
5.3.  CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
In Croatian legal theory, it is not clear whether clausula rebus sic stantibus should apply only 
to bilateral or whether it might be applied to unilateral contracts, as well. In the COA, this 
institute is located in the part of the Act that deals with the effects of bilateral contracts, so 
therefore, most commentators assume that, by putting it in this part of the Act, it is implied 
that it should be applied only to bilateral contracts. In the literature, it is mainly stated that 
the reason for the existence of this clause is to protect the equivalence of parties’ obligations 
and (precisely because of that?) it should only be applied to bilateral contracts.64 Nevertheless, 
there are opinions that there is no reason for clausula rebus sic stantibus not to be applied to 
unilateral contracts.65 The reason for this is the fact that one of the reasons for its existence is, 
among other things, exoneration of the debtor from the negative consequences of the changed 
circumstances. This is certainly in accordance with the principle of conscientiousness and fa-
irness. Therefore, there should not be a reason not to apply clausula rebus sic stantibus to such 
contracts, since negative consequences of changed circumstances may affect the debtor even 
in unilateral contracts.66
Alo, from the above analyzed provisions, it is clear that clausula rebus sic stantibus in Croa-
tian law of obligations applies not only to bilateral contracts but also to liability for damages. 
Also, its purpose is not always to re-establish the equivalence between obligations, since it 
also affects certain aleatory contracts in which equivalence between obligations does not exist 
and which, unlike most other contracts, cannot be annulled because of disrupted equivalen-
ce.67 It is, therefore, unclear: what is the reason for the persistent exclusion of the possibility 
of application of clausula rebus sic stantibus to unilateral contracts? The arguments that this 
institute in the Law of Obligation is in the part referring only to bilateral treaties, and that it 
only serves to restore equivalence of obligations, obviously do not stand. This issue is especia-
lly evident when we look at the institute of changed circumstances in comparative law, where 
it is accepted in many European civic codifications that it not only affects bilateral, but also 
unilateral contracts.
64  Belaj, op.cit. 62, p. 10-11; Nikšić, op.cit. 13, p. 573, 583-584; Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 23,26; Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 39.
65  Nikšić, op.cit. 13, p. 573; Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 23-27; Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 39.
66  Petrić ibid.
  An example could be a donation contract in which the donor, since clausula rebus sic stantibus does not apply to this type of contract, 
would have to fulfill his/her obligation even when its fulfillment is significantly impeded and he/she is not responsible for the 
impediment. Of course, there is a possibility of recalling the gift before it is due because of impoverishment of the donor (Art. 492 
of the COA), which in any case represents a changed circumstance, but this is certainly not the only circumstance that may happen 
after the conclusion of the donation contract and before its due date, which could cause difficulties in donor’s fulfillment of the 
contract and cause him/her excessive losses. Nikšić, op.cit. 13, p. 573; Petrić, op.cit 7, p. 25; Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 39.
67  Art. 375 p. 5 of the COA.
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For example, the Italian Codice Civile in its Art. 1468 stipulates that clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus also applies to unilateral contracts, in which case the affected party may not be able 
to demand termination of such a contract, but may require reduction of the obligation or a 
change in the manner in which it is fulfilled, which certainly has a significant positive effect 
on that party’s position.68
Unlike Art. 1468 of Codice Civile, German BGB in its Art. 313 does not precisely state which 
contracts can be modified or terminated due to changed circumstances, which results in this 
provision also being applicable to bilateral, as well as to unilateral contracts.69 Commentators 
who have studied this issue in German legal theory, also agree with this interpretation.70
The Austrian law goes even further, since clausula rebus sic stantibus can even be applied to 
unilateral declarations of will.71 An example of this is the declaration of will of a patient when 
expressing his/her wishes regarding medical procedures in the event of loss of ability to reason 
or express his/her will.72 Such manifestation will cease to produce legal effects in the event 
that the state of medical science has changed significantly from the time when it was done, 
that is, if the circumstances that existed at the time of the declaration were changed.73 This 
is seen in §10.1.3 of the Austrian Bundesgesetz über Patientenverfügungen which clearly shows 
that, in Austria, the only ratio of existence of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, is not solely to 
re-establish the equivalence of obligations.
68  “Nell’ipotesi prevista dall’articolo precedente se si tratta di un contratto nel quale una sola delle parti ha assunto obbligazioni, 
questa può chiedere una riduzione della sua prestazione ovvero una modificazione nelle modalità di esecuzione, sufficienti per 
ricondurla ad equità.”
69  “Haben sich Umstände, die zur Grundlage des Vertrags geworden sind, nach Vertragsschluss schwerwiegend verändert…” 
§ 313.
70  Nikšić, op.cit. 13, p. 571; Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 24.
  However, it should be emphasized that Article 369 of the COA also does not expressly state which contracts may be modified 
or terminated due to changed circumstances, but because these provision are placed in the part of the Act relating to bilateral 
contracts, most authors consider that, for this reason, this clause should be applied only to such contracts.
71  Regarding the legal nature of the patient’s consent to medical procedure, there are different opinions. Thus, Gavella thinks that 
giving consent is a legal affair that operates within the limits of its existence, content and validity, and states that the validity of 
this statement is judged by the general rules concerning validity of legal affairs (Gavella, N., Osobna prava, I. dio, Zagreb, 2000., 
p. 58 and 88), while Klarić considers that giving consent to a medical proceedure can not be considered an ordinary legal affair 
because its purpose is not the disposition of property. This author thinks that patient’s consent has to do with realization of the 
fundamental personal rights - the right to life and physical integrity, for which there is no need for business capability. Maturity 
and ability to understand the meaning of a medical proceedure (i.e. the ability to reason) is suffcient for patient’s consent. 
(Klarić, P., Povreda prava na tjelesni integritet u medicini u: Alaburić, V. et al., Odgovornost za neimovinsku štetu zbog povrede 
prava osobnosti, Narodne novine, 2006, p. 192–193). 
  As far as comparative law is concerned, German and Austrian law do not regard patient’s right to consent to a medical proceedure 
as a legal affair, but as an act similar to legal affair. In Swiss law, it is considered a unilateral contract. More in Nikšić, S., Ugovor 
o zdravstvenoj usluzi, Ph. D. thesis, Zagreb, 2007, p. 371–373.
72  Bundesgesetz über Patientenverfügungen (Patientenverfügungs-Gesetz – PatVG), 8. 5. 2006, §10, 1, 3:
  “Eine Patientenverfügung ist unwirksam, wenn (…) der Stand der medizinischen Wissenschaft sich im Hinblick auf den Inhalt 
der Patientenverfügung seit ihrer Errichtung wesentlich geändert hat.” Full text available at:
  https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/RegV/REGV-COO-2026-100-2-137773/REGV-COO-2026-100-2-137773.pdf (March, 3, 
2018).
73  Nikšić, op.cit. 13, p. 573.
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6.   MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT – SOME 
SUGGESTIONS DE LEGE FERENDA
Regarding the possibilities that exist in the event of a change of circumstances after the 
conclusion of the contract, Art. 369 of COA is clear: there may be modification or termination 
of the contract. However, there are certain ambiguities that arise from the omission of regula-
ting certain problems concerning the above mentioned two possibilities in said article.
The contracting parties would certainly be able to modify or terminate the contract by both 
agreeing to do so and this is, without a doubt, the most desirable solution. However, despite of 
the fact that the problem would, in that case, be solved in a peaceful manner, the provisions of 
the COA that deal with changed circumstances do not specifically determine that the contra-
cting parties are obliged (to at least try) to resolve their problem peacefully, before the affected 
party turns to court for help.74 The imposition of this obligation on the contracting parties 
would certainly be in accordance with Art. 186 (a) of the Civil Procedure Act, which prescribes 
the general obligation to try to settle disputes peacefully, which in turn, leads to the unbur-
denment of courts since it is possible that, at least in some cases, contracting parties would 
succeed in agreeing to modify or terminate the contract.75 Something similar is found in the 
aforementioned art. 1195 of the French Code Civile (amended in 2016), which also requires 
parties to try to peacefully solve their problem, and only if there is no reasonable agreement 
within a reasonable time, the court is engaged.
Furthermore, not only does COA not determine that the contracting parties have to try to 
resolve their issues peacefully, but the affected party may submit a request for modification or 
termination of the contract to the court, even without having to give notice to opposing party, 
since such notice is not one of the prerequisites set out in Art. 369 of COA. It has previously 
been mentioned that the affected party will be liable for the damages caused to the opposing 
party, if he/she suffers damages because he/she was not informed of the affected party’s in-
tent to seek modification or termination of the contract. However, in case the opposing party 
does not suffer any damages, there is no motivation for the affected party to notify him/her. It 
appears that it would be judicious to impose on the affected party the obligation to notify the 
opposing party by making this notification one of the prerequisites that need to be fulfilled 
in order for affected party to turn to court for help. In that way, without this notification, it 
would not be possible to ask the court to modify or terminate the contract in question. This 
would certainly be in accordance with the earlier proposal and also with Art. 5 of COA, which 
prescribes the duty of co-operation for contractual parties, and could, consequently, lead to 
a peaceful solution to the problems arisen because of changed circumstances, without the 
involvement of the court.
Also, from the analysis of the Art. 369, p. 1, it could be concluded that the legislator went 
in favorem negotiatii, since it determined that the affected party: “(...) may require that the 
contract be amended or even terminated (...)” which might indicate that the termination of 
74  Šafranko, Z., Rebus sic stantibus, Pravo u gospodarstvu, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2010, p. 1294.
75  Civil Proceedure Act, National gazette, 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008, 
123/2008, 57/2011, 148/2011, 25/2013, 89/2014.
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contract is the last resort, only if modification is not possible.76 However, if the legislators 
really wanted this provision to be in favorem negotii, it is unclear why did they simply not 
explicitly specify by this article the order in which the affected party can relieve consequences 
of changed circumstances – termination of the contract only if its modification is not possible 
(as is done, for example, in §313 (3) of German BGB).77
There is also a problem with what the opposite party wants in case of termination or mo-
dification of the contract. If the affected party decides to ask for modification of contract due 
to changed circumstances, it may not be in accordance with what the opposing party wants, so 
the question arises: can the contract be changed in that case? Here, opinions differ, but most 
commentators agree that the contract can be modified without the consent of the opposite 
party.78 The reason for this is the text of Art. 369 of the COA which entitles the affected party 
to request either termination or modification of a contract, but in none of the paragraphs of 
the said Article is it stated that the consent of the opposing party is required for the amen-
dment. That party would, therefore, not have the right to refuse modification of the contract, 
provided that the modification is possible and, with it, the purpose of the contract could be 
fulfilled, regardless of the fact that such modification may, for some reason, not be what he/
she wants.
Conversely, if the affected party, instead of modification, decides to request termination of 
contract and submits such a request to the court, the termination will not occur if the oppo-
sing party offers or agrees to fair modification of the contract.79 So, now the situation is rever-
se – this time the will of the affected party is not taken into account, to whom termination of 
the contract might be more suitable. Both of these cases may cause violation of the principle 
of equality laid down in Art. 3 of the COA, because they lead to modification of contract based 
on the will of only one contracting party. It seems that this problem, at least in part, could be 
resolved if the COA determined that the contractual parties first have the obligation to try 
to modify the contract, and only in the event that modification is not possible, could they 
76  Eraković, op.cit. 4, 135; Golub, A., Pravne posljedice raskida ugovora, Aktualnosti hrvatskog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, 
Godišnjak 23, Zagreb, 2016, p. 560; Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 48; Šafranko, opc.cit. 74, p. 1295.
77  § 313 (3): “Ist eine Anpassung des Vertrags nicht möglich oder einem Teil nicht zumutbar, so kann der benachteiligte Teil vom 
Vertrag zurücktreten. An die Stelle des Rücktrittsrechts tritt für Dauerschuldverhältnisse das Recht zur Kündigung.”
78  Golub, op.cit. 76, p. 561; Petrić, op.cit. 7, p. 4-43; Slakoper, op.cit. 32, p. 49; Šafranko, op.cit. 74, p. 1295.
79  Art. 369 p. 4 COA.
  According to Art. 133 p. 1 i 4 of the ‘old’ Law on Obligations the affected party could not have seeked modification of the 
contract, but only its termination, which would not occurr if the opposing party offered an amendment. See also case law:
  “Dakle, određenoj stranci i pod određenim pretpostavkama pripada pravo da ugovor raskine, ali ne može tražiti, bez valjanog 
pristanka protivne strane, izmjenu ugovornih uvjeta” (VS, Rev 2439/1993-2, 4. studenoga 1993.).
  “Thus, a certain party has the right to terminate a contract under certain circumstances, but cannot seek, without the express 
consent of the opposing party, its modification” (translated by authors).
  “(…) tuženikovo je pravo bilo sudskim putem zahtijevati raskid ugovora, dok izmjenu ugovornih odredbi može zahtijevati samo 
uz pristanak suprotne ugovorne strane kako to propisuje odredba čl. 133. st. 4. ZOO-a. Dakle, nije moguće tužitelja kao suprotnu 
stranu siliti na izmjenu ugovornih odredbi, već je tuženikova mogućnost bila zahtijevati raskid ugovora, ako su nastupile 
takve okolnosti, što sve tuženik nije dokazao tijekom postupka pa je stoga pravilno prvostupanjski sud te prigovore ocijenio 
neosnovanim” (VTS, Pž-2815/07-4, 27. travnja 2010.).
  “(…) the defendant has the right to ask the court to terminate a contract, while its modification may be requested only with the 
consent of the opposing party, as is prescribed by the provision of Art. 133 p 4 of Law on Obligations. Thus, it is not possible to 
compel the plaintiff, who is the opposing party, to accept modification, it is only possible for the defendant to seek termination 
of the contract if such circumstances have arisen, which was not proven by the defendant during the proceedings, and therefore 
the court of first instance was right while considering those objections to be unfounded” (translated by authors).
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terminate it. The court should be involved only in case contracting parties could not reach an 
agreement about modification or termination, within a reasonable time.
7.  CONCLUSION
As stated above, it is possible to assume that contracts must be fulfilled at all costs and 
insist, without exception, on the application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. However, 
this would, in some cases, be contrary to certain fundamental principles of civil law, since 
the contracting party whose fulfillment of contract had become overly difficult or would have 
caused him/her an overwhelming loss, would be required to remain faithful to such a contract. 
Therefore, Croatian, and many other legal systems, have argued that one should strive to fulfill 
the contract whenever possible, but if the relevant circumstances have changed significantly 
and certain prerequisites are fulfilled, the affected party should be allowed to seek modifica-
tion or termination of the contract. From analyzed case law it is clear that, regardless of the 
fact that clausula rebus sic stantibus is a natural ingredient of all contracts, it is interpreted in 
an exceptionally restrictive way, as it may seriously undermine trust in the binding force of 
contracts.
In regard to the provisions of the COA that pertain to changed circumstances, this paper 
outlines the ways in which these provisions could be improved de lege ferenda on the basis of 
certain solutions that exist in comparative law and in the way that these provisions would 
be more in line with other provisions of the COA itself, but also with some other Croatian 
provisions and also with some of the basic principles of civil law and law of obligations. First 
of all, it should be considered to extend the application of the clausula rebus sic stantibus to 
unilateral contracts. The prevailing arguments for why this clause cannot be applied to these 
types of contracts is that in Croatian law of obligation it only applies to bilateral contracts and 
that its purpose is re-establishment of the equivalence of obligations. But after analyzing the 
provisions of the COA pertaining to this institute, it becomes clear that this clause applies also 
to the non-contractual relationship -  liability for damages, and also to contracts of support 
for life and contract of support until death, that are aleatory, and because of that not affect by 
disturbance of equivalence of obligations. It is, therefore, unclear why clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus does not extend to unilateral contracts. This is particularly the case when this clause is 
observed in the light of comparative law, where Austria, Italy and Germany (expressly of not) 
allow its application to unilateral contracts.
Moreover, it seems questionable that COA has not explicitly stipulated that the contra-
cting parties have a duty to cooperate in resolving the newly established situation. This could 
at least try to solve some of the problems that may occur. First of all, it would be desirable for 
the contracting parties first to try to resolve the situation in a peaceful manner, and only if 
they do not succeed, could they resolve it through court. This would certainly be in accordance 
with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and the unburdenment of courts. Furthermore, the co-operation of the contracting parties 
would in particular make sense if the COA explicitly prescribed the order of possible solutions 
to the problems arising from the changes in circumstances – first, attempt to modify the con-
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tract, if it is possible and feasible, while the termination should be the last resort. This would 
be in accordance with the principle of in favorem negotii, which should always be the aim of law 
of obligations. That way, clausula rebus sic stantibus would not excessively undermine the trust 
in the binding force of contracts.
The next problem was found in the fact that if the affected party requests modification of 
the contract due to changed circumstances, the opposite party will be forced to do so, although 
he/she does not want modification, and vice versa: if the affected party requires for a termina-
tion, the opposing party can prevent it by offering or agreeing to modification of the contract, 
which is contrary to the principle of equality. This problem too could be resolved, in a number 
of cases, if it was prescribed that the contracting parties must try to resolve the new situation 
by agreement, because, in that case there would be a real chance for them to agree about mo-
dification or termination of the contract.
The last problem that was found could also be resolved if contracting parties had to coope-
rate in resolving the issue. The affected party should be obliged to notify the opposite party 
about his/her intentions to ask for modification or termination of the contract. That notifi-
cation should be one of the prerequisites that have to be fulfilled before the affected party 
requests from court to modify or terminate the contract. Not informing the opposite party 
would certainly be in contradiction with Art. 5 of the COA, which determines that contractual 
parties have the duty to co-operate in contractual relations. This, and most other above-menti-
oned problems, would be prevented if it was determined that the contracting parties have the 
obligation to primarily try to solve their problem in a peaceful manner.
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